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W.: Criminal Law--Due Process--Coerced Confession in State Court

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
narily must only prove three fundamental things. First, it must be
proved that there was an intent to sell or dispose of goods or services.
State v. Carruthers,21 S.W.2d 895 (Mo. App. 1929). Secondly, the
prosecution must establish that this advertisment was placed before
the publie in some manner. People v. Wahl, 39 Cal. App. 2d 771, 100
P.2d 550 (1940). Thirdly, such advertising must have contained
therein an untrue or misleading statement. People v. Byrnes, 117
Colo. 528, 190 P.2d 584 (1948). Thus it is seen that the statute imposes absolute liability on the advertiser; yet, from the small number of convictions thereunder it appears something more is necessary.
The major reason for the small number of convictions under
these statutes is the lack of an initiating agency to enforce them. Local police and other prosecuting agencies are probably unaware of
the existence of such a statute, and, even if they are aware, their
energies are diverted towards more profitable pursuits. A further
reason may be attributed to the narrow construction given the statutes by the courts. Only when the enforcement of the statutes is
assigned to some special agency or agencies and the courts begin to
focus a sterner view toward deceptive advertisers will the reason
for the enactment of these statutes be accomplished.
J. O. F.
CRnnmAL LAw-DuE PNocEss-CoEmcED CoN SSON
o IN STATE

CouRTs.-D, a mentally dull 19 year old Negro, was convicted of
murder and sentenced to death. He had been arrested without a
warrant, denied a hearing before a magistrate at which, under state
law, he would be advised of his right to counsel and to remain silent,
held incommunicado for more than two days, and told by the chief of
police that there were thirty or forty people coming who wanted to
get him. Under these circumstances D confessed to the murder.
The confession was admitted in evidence over the objection of D's
counsel. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, the Supreme Court of
Arkansas affirmed and D brought certiorari. Held, that D's confession was coerced and its admission into evidence was denial of
due process under U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Payne v. State, 354
U.S. 930 (1958).
Whether a confession made to police officers after arrest is voluntary or coerced is ordinarily a question directed to the discretion of
the trial court. State v. Dowell, 47 Idaho 457, 276 Pac. 39 (1929); 3
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EviDENc § 861 (3d ed. 1940). The same proposition
holds true in the courts of West Virginia. State v. Brady, 104 W. Va.
528, 140 S.E. 546 (1927). Accord, State v. Richards, 101 W. Va. 136,
182 S.E. 375 (1926).
WiGmoII,

Factors to be considered by the trial court in determining the
voluntariness of the confession are the conditions and circumstances
surrounding the confessor. Confessions induced by fear, though not
aroused by spoken threats, are nevertheless involuntary, because the
fear which takes away the freedom may arise solely from the conditions and circumstances surrounding the confessor. People v.
Goldblatt, 388 Ill. 176, 49 N.E. 2d 36 (1948); White v. State, 129
Miss. 182, 91 So. 903 (1922); 8 WiGmoim, EVIDENCE § 834 (3d ed.
1940). In State v. Rogers, 238 N.C. 390, 64 S.E.2d 572 (1951), the
court held that "a confession made under circumstances that would
reasonably lead the person charged to believe that it would be better
to confess himself guilty of a crime he had not committed, is an involuntary confession."
As a corollary, it may be noted that, in West Virginia, the burden
of proof is on the state to show facts justifying the admission of a
confession.. State v. Brady, supra.
Under the authority cited, we may inquire whether the confession in the principal case can justifiably be held as involuntary. See
also, 20 AM. JuY. Evidence §§ 496 et seq. (1939); 7 Mic=E JUn.
Evidence §§ 224, 229 (1949).
As to the admissibility of a confession in evidence, delay in arraignment, as in the present case, does not of itself render the confession inadmissible. People v. Alex, 265 N.Y. 192, 192 N.E. 289
(1934). However, under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
incriminating statements solicited from the defendant during a period of unlawful detention are inadmissible. Mallory v. United
States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); Comment, 60 W. VA. L. REV. 195
(1958). This case can be distinguished on the basis of federal law
in a federal court, not state law in a state court. The fact that officers in charge fail to inform the defendant that his confession may be
used against him will not invalidate the confession. Cahill v. People,
111 Colo. 29, 187 P.2d 678 (1948). In Mack v. State, 203 Ind. 355,
180 N.E. 279 (1982), the court stated that confessions and admissions
made voluntarily or under inducement other than fear produced by
physical violence, threats, intimidation, or undue influence, are ad-
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missible in evidence. The West Virginia law on the admissibility of
a coerced confession is to the effect that a confession of a person
accused of crime is inadmissible in evidence if not freely and voluntarily made. State v. Brady, supra. For further authority, see 20
Am. Jon. Evidence § 480 (1989), and 7 Micam Jim. Evidence § 280
(1949).
Turning next to the constitutional question involved, the Texas

Court of Criminal Appeals has held that conviction of crime in a
state court by use of coerced, forced or involuntary confession constitutes denial of due process as guaranteed by U.S.

CONST.

amend.

XIV, § 1. Prince v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 108, 281 S.W.2d 419
(1950).

The same proposition was announced in Golemon v. State,

157 Tex. Crim. 584, 247 S.W.2d 119 (1952).
The 'West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has never decided
this question, nor do we find any decision of the Supreme Court of
Virginia in which a coerced confession admitted in evidence was
held to be a denial of due process. However, the West Virginia
court held in State v. Sponaugle, 45 W. Va. 415, 82 S.E. 288 (1898),
that the Supreme Court of the United States is to decide finally
whether legislation or action under state authority is due process of
law. The United States Suipreme Court stated in Rochin v. People,
842 U.S. 165 (1952), that involuntary verbal confessions are inadmissible in state criminal trials under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, even though statements contained in them
may be independently established as true. Under these two holdings, one by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia and the
other by the United States Supreme Court, it would appear that the
West Virginia courts are bound by the proposition that the admission
of a coerced confession in evidence is a denial of due process.
From this review of authorities, it appears that the confession
admitted in evidence was an involuntary confession under the law of
the majority of jurisdictions, including West Virginia. The use of a
coerced confession in evidence is not permitted, and such admission
is a denial of due process under U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
In the principal case a state court's admission of a coerced confession in a criminal case constituted error, and once again we find
the Supreme Court of the United States carefully guarding the rights
of the accused under the due process clause of the federal constitution.
J. F. W., Jr.
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